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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 20, 1979

TLC
H.R.F.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR *RP*

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

At your request I have taken the main points in my memorandum to you and included them in a memorandum from you to Secretary of State Vance. Still, I recommend that you use the memorandum as talking points with the Secretary rather than send i I am gun-shy -- not to say paranoid -- about sending memos from here to other agencies. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

Therefore, I recommend that you not send the memorandum at Tab I, but rather phone Secretary Vance.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Jessica Mathews

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Review on March 20, 1979

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~
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IPS by SA Date 12-5-10

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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Date

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

I understand that you are considering changing our approach to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in human rights. I have read the INR report on the human rights situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach the United States Government should take to Argentina, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to respect human rights? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience -- in the U.S. and elsewhere -- before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights

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Review on March 20, 1985

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policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue, still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners, they have released the names of about 3,5000 people who remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The last --the invitation-- may well be the most important. It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate basis on which we and other countries should make decisions on human rights to Argentina. (S)

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and correct until such time as the human rights situation dramatically improves and the government has begun to move toward democratization. I believe that we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to improve their human rights situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S)

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would recommend that you delay implementing this approach until after the Commission has completed its report. I realize that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the wait is justified. (S)

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong, cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export-Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S)

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

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#5C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 10, 1979

NOTE TO: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS *hur*
SUBJECT: Argentina and Human Rights Policy

Bob's recommendation is that we delay a change in policy until after the IAHRC visit and report, and indicates that the delay will be a few months. In fact it will probably be much longer. It took 13 months after the visit to El Salvador to get out the final report. It will take at least as long to do the controversial Argentine report. So we are talking about a probable delay until June 1980 at least.

cc: Bob Pastor

*1 agree
2P.*

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on March 9, 1985

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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1363

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR *BP*

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina in the IFI's. We changed our position to abstention in February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that would induce some improvement in the human rights situation. Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the IFI's, lobby OECD countries to follow our example; and assess whether further action in X-M and OPIC should be taken. (S)

Assessment

The report was prepared by INR--not HA-- and it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises in 1978 by the Argentine government, it has not improved. Let me summarize the report:

-- There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilitated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce this number. (S)

-- "Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment." The Red Cross estimated that 90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are executed. (S)

-- Disappearances -- probably by security units -- continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978 (Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 400 per month, while

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ORIGINAL CL BY R. Pastor
DECL ☒ REVW CM March 5, 1985

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PRISON

NW 57067 DocId:33067461 Page 5

Declassified Case: INW-57067 Date: 06-06-2009

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SSP
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the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy estimates, 55.) Increasingly, the people who disappear have vague associations with the "political left" rather than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S)

-- Illegal invasion of the home -- including theft by security units -- remains as commonplace as fair public trials are infrequent. (S)

The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina's Federal Security Service estimated that there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes that the explanation for continued official terrorism is army politics. (S)

Policy

While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw different conclusions than State as to what policy we should adopt. I understand that Vance and Christopher approach the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs loans. (Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.) The law only requires that we "oppose" such loans, and "opposition" has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative votes so I believe we have some flexibility. (S)

In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

An Effective Policy

What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government

decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case of our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us for three reasons: (1) our historical, reasonably close relationship; (2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.; (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights area at home. I think our cool and correct posture has been as effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina, and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. (S)

In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher do, that we should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage delay. (S)

One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting a bit longer: (1) The Argentine government has been paralyzed by the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move. (2) Several of Argentina's most hard-line Generals have been transferred, and Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before. (3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front over the next few months. And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is going there in May. We should wait and gear any new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six months or more.

RECOMMENDATION:

Vance has apparently decided to change our policy. I therefore recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. If he remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision pending the IAHRC report.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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cc: Jessica Mathews Views:

Bob is right that our primary concern should be what will work with Argentina. Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Channel dispute is over. On the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either. I suspect that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets much more secure or there is a strong change in Argentine public opinion.

However, there is one important consideration missing here, namely the relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is impossible to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand toward the GOA.

If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights policy — returning to the tougher "no" vote position.

Jim

Maybe
2B - *Maybe we should*
be friendly, strong then Videla
hand, and see if he then can
clean up his act. We would
also shut him out but it
might be worth it.

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1363

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1979

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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

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DECL ☒ REVW ON March 5, 1985

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RECOMMENDATION:

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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But isn't this your primary recommendation?
This reads like "ask him to change his mind in the first place? and if he doesn't agree, ask him to change his mind." - no?

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4

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Jhm

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